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The Evolution of Wisconsin's
Sexual Predator Law
I. INTRODUCTION
On May 26, 1994, the Wisconsin State Assembly enacted chapter 980
of the Wisconsin Criminal Code, entitled "Sexually Violent Person
Commitments."' This statute, which has been labeled the "sexual
predator law," permits the State to classify persons as sexually violent
and commit them indefinitely to a civil treatment facility after they have
served their criminal sentences.
Civil commitment for sex offenders is not a new concept.2 Many
states, including Wisconsin, at one time committed sex offenders under
"sexual psychopath statutes."3 However, these commitments were in
lieu of incarceration, and many states have since repealed such laws.4
Today, the trend is once again toward committing sex offenders, only
now it is accomplished under a new procedure that commits them after
they have served their criminal sentences. Washington State pioneered
this procedure, and its effort has received a great deal of public
support.5
Washington's law began as a grass-roots campaign led by Mrs. Ida
Ballasiotes in response to the 1988 rape and murder of her daughter,
Dianne, by repeat sex offender Gene Raymond Kane.6 However, Mrs.
Ballasiotes's struggle received little notice from the Washington
legislature until the horrific kidnapping, rape, and castration of a seven-
year-old boy by repeat offender Earl K. Shriner.7 Shriner's crime incited
the Washington legislature, and on July 1, 1990, it enacted section 71.09
of the Washington Code entitled "Sexually Violent Predators. '8
1. WIS. STAT. § 980 (1994).
2. Kelly A. McCaffrey, Comment, The Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators
in Kansas: A Modern Law for Modem Times, 42 KAN. L. REv. 887, 888 (1994).
3. Id. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 975 (1977).
4. McCaffrey, supra note 2, at 889. Wisconsin's original sex crimes law, chapter 975,
became ineffective July 1, 1980.
5. Barry Siegel, Locking up 'Sexual Predators,' Los ANGELES TIMES, May 10, 1990, at
Al.
6. Marie A. Bochnewich, Comment, Prediction of Dangerousness and Washington's
Sexually Violent Predator Statute, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 277, 280 (1992).
7. Id. After his arrest for this offense, it was also discovered that while in prison for a
prior offense, Shriner told a cellmate that he wanted a van equipped with cages so he could
capture children and sexually abuse and murder them. Id.
8. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 1994).
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Wisconsin, also outraged by repeat sex offenders, was impressed by
Washington's effort and decided to follow Washington's lead.
Part II of this Comment describes Wisconsin's version of the
Washington law and illustrates the method by which a sexual predator
is committed. Part III outlines the constitutional issues implicated by the
sexual predator law, as those issues were addressed by the parties in an
appeal involving the Wisconsin law. Part IV discusses both the
Washington State Supreme Court decision that upheld Washington's
sexual predator law, and the subsequent district court opinion overruling
that decision. Part V discusses the Wisconsin Supreme Court's ruling on
the Wisconsin statutory scheme. Part VI addresses other issues future
courts should resolve when analyzing sexual predator statutes.
II. THE WISCONSIN STATUTE
Chapter 980 begins by defining several terms critical to the imple-
mentation of the statute.9 These terms include "mental disorder,"1
"sexually motivated,"" "sexually violent offense,"'" and "sexually
violent person."' 3
The statute then describes the procedure by which a person is labeled
a sexually violent person and committed under the statute. First, the
agency with jurisdiction over the custody of a sex offender notifies the
Wisconsin Department of Justice and the local district attorney's office
three months prior to the anticipated release of a sexually violent
person. 4 Second, a petition is filed by the Department of Justice
alleging that the person has been convicted of a sexually violent offense,
found delinquent for a sexually violent offense, or found not guilty of a
9. WIS. STAT. § 980.01 (1994).
10. "'Mental disorder' means a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional
or volitional capacity that predisposes a person to engage in acts of sexual violence." Id
§ 980.01(2).
11. "'Sexually motivated' means that one of the purposes for an act is for the actor's
sexual arousal or gratification." Id. § 980.01(5).
12. "'Sexually violent offense' means any crime specified ... or any crime that is
determined, in a proceeding under § 980.05(3)(b), to have been sexually motivated." Id
§ 980.01(6).
13. "Sexually violent person" means a person who has been convicted of a sexually
violent offense, has been adjudicated delinquent for a sexually violent offense, or has
been found not guilty of or not responsible for a sexually violent offense by reason
of insanity or mental disease, defect or illness, and who is dangerous because he or
she suffers from a mental disorder that makes it substantially probable that the
person will engage in acts of sexual violence.
Id § 980.01(7).
14. Id. § 980.015(2).
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sexually violent offense by reason of mental disease or defect. 5 The
petition must also allege that the person has a mental disorder, and that
the person is dangerous to others because of the risk that he or she will
engage in future sexually violent acts.
16
The person subject to such a petition has the right to a probable
cause hearing within seventy-two hours of the fling of the petition. 7
If the court does not find probable cause, the petition is dismissed.
Otherwise, the person is ordered to an appropriate facility for evalua-
tion.18
No later than forty-five days after the probable cause hearing, a trial
must commence to determine if the person subject to the petition is
sexually violent. 9 At the trial, all rules of evidence and all constitution-
al rights apply.2 Either party may request a jury of twelve, and the
State has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is a sexually violent person.2' If a unanimous jury, or the
court in a bench trial, determines that the defendant is sexually violent,
the defendant is committed into custody for control, care, and treatment
until the defendant is no longer sexually violent.' Such custody may
mean commitment in a mental health unit or supervised release.'
Supervised release is subject to conditions set by the court, and any
violation results in revocation of the release and recommitment of the
defendant.24 If the defendant is placed in a mental health unit, periodic
reexaminations by the health unit are required to determine if the
defendant has made enough progress to be released.' The first
examination must occur within six months of the initial commitment,
with reexaminations occurring at least every twelve months thereafter.26
The defendant is also permitted to petition the court for supervised
release or discharge, and the State must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant is still sexually violent.27
15. Id- § 980.02(2)(a).
16. Id. § 980.02(2)(c).
17. Id. § 980.04(2).
18. 1d. § 980.04(3).
19. I1& § 980.05(1).
20. Id. § 980.05(lm).
21. Id. H§ 980.05(2)-(3).
22. Id. § 980.06(l).
23. Id. § 980.06(2)(b).
24. Id. § 980.06(2)(d).
25. Id. § 980.07(1).
26. Id.
27. Id. §§ 980.08, 980.09(b).
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On July 21, 1994, Dane County Circuit Court Judge Mark Frankel
became the first judge to find Wisconsin's sexual predator statute
unconstitutional.' After Judge Frankel's ruling, many other circuit
court judges also found the statute unconstitutional.29 The State
appealed four of those decisions in a consolidated appeal. 0 That
appeal bypassed the Wisconsin Court of Appeals and was certified
directly to the Wisconsin Supreme Court,31 which issued a decision on
December 8, 1995.
III. THE WISCONSIN APPEAL
A. The Parties
The Wisconsin appeal was based on the consolidation of four cases,
State v. Carpenter, Appeal No. 94-1898, State v. Schmidt, Appeal No. 94-
2024, State v. Post, Appeal No. 94-2356, and State v. Oldakowski, Appeal
No. 94-2357. The following is a description of the facts of each case.32
1. William Carpenter
Carpenter was convicted of sexually assaulting a seven-year-old girl
in 1984. He was sentenced to twelve years in prison, but his sentence
was stayed and he was placed on probation for ten years. After repeated
probation violations, Carpenter's probation was revoked and he was
incarcerated. In 1993, Carpenter was paroled; however, in early 1994, he
was reincarcerated based on the "Turner decision" in which the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals reinterpreted the good-time diminution of
criminal sentences to be one month for every twelve months instead of
one month for every eleven.33 A short time later, the Turner decision
28. Erich C. Straub & James E. Kachelski, The Constitutionality of Wisconsin's Sexual
Predator Law, WISCONSIN LAwYER, July 1995, at 15.
29. IdL
30. Id
31. Certification by Court of Appeals of Wisconsin District IV, State v. Carpenter, No.
94-1898 (Wis. filed Dec. 30, 1994) [hereinafter Appeal Certification]. For more information
regarding the criteria for bypass, see DAVID L. WALTHER, PATRICIA L. GROVE, & MICHAEL
S. HEFFERNAN, APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN WISCONSIN § 24 (1986). See also
WIS. STAT. § 809.61 (1995).
32. Facts taken from pages 9-13 of the Appeal Certification.
33. State ex rel Parker v. Fielder, 180 Wis. 2d 438,459-62, 509 N.W.2d 440,448-50 (Ct.
App. 1993). This case is called the "Turner decision" because the respondent was Gerald M.
Turner, Jr. Turner sexually molested and murdered a nine-year-old girl in 1973 while the girl
was trick-or-treating on Halloween night.
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was reversed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court34 and all prisoners
incarcerated under it, including Carpenter, were supposed to be released.
Instead of releasing Carpenter, the Dane County district attorney filed
a chapter 980 petition.
2. William Schmidt
Schmidt was convicted of fourth-degree sexual assault in 1992 and
was placed on three years probation. Eight months later, he was charged
with first-degree sexual assault and was sentenced to three years in
prison. Schmidt became eligible for release in June 1994, but the
Wisconsin Department of Justice filed a chapter 980 petition.
3. Samuel Post
Post, in two separate incidents, abducted women from shopping mall
parking lots at gun point and raped and robbed them. He was convicted
of the crimes in 1976, and in 1977 was committed to the custody of the
Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services under Wisconsin's
former sex crimes law, chapter 975. Post was paroled in 1990 but was
recommitted in 1992 for allegedly fondling his minor stepdaughter. He
was to be released on July 15, 1994, but the Wisconsin Department of
Justice filed a chapter 980 petition.
4. Ben Oldakowski
Oldakowski was convicted of rape in 1972 and was committed under
former chapter 975. Subsequently, he was paroled and recommitted
three times for sexual assault, exposure, and lewd and lascivious
behavior. Like Post, Oldakowski was supposed to be released July 15,
1994, but the Wisconsin Department of Justice filed a chapter 980
petition.
In all four cases, the criminal defendants moved to dismiss the
chapter 980 petitions, citing equal protection, double jeopardy, ex post
facto, and due process violations.35 At each defendant's hearing, the
trial judge found probable cause to believe that the defendants met the
statutory criteria to be detained for trial; however, each judge also found
chapter 980 to be unconstitutional.36 The State appealed the trial court
judges' conclusion that chapter 980 is unconstitutional. The next section
34. State ex reL Parker v. Sullivan, 184 Wis. 2d 668, 517 N.W.2d 449 (1994).
35. Appeal Certification at 3.
36. Id. at 13. Despite the unconstitutionality findings, the defendants remained detained
pending resolution of the appeal by virtue of a stay issued by the court of appeals. Id. n. 40.
1996]
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outlines the constitutional issues as they were addressed by the parties
in the appeal.
B. Constitutional Issues
1. Equal Protection
Equal protection of the laws is guaranteed by the United States and
Wisconsin Constitutions.3 7 To determine whether equal protection has
been violated by a statute, a court must first decide whether the statute
governs classes of persons within a similarly situated group. In their
briefs, both parties compared those persons committed under chapter 980
to those committed for mental illness under chapter 51.38 Therefore,
there is an implied agreement that the similarly situated group is made
up of people subject to involuntary civil commitment.
After a similarly situated group has been identified, the court must
next decide the standard of review to apply to a statute that treats
members of that group differently. If the classification affects a
fundamental liberty or is a suspect classification, the highest level of
scrutiny must be applied; otherwise, the state only needs to show a
rational basis for the classification.39
The State's position in the Wisconsin appeal was that "no fundamen-
tal liberty is implicated, nor is a suspect classification established," and
therefore a rational basis standard should apply.' The State further
argued that a rational basis exists to treat the mentally ill differently than
the sexually violent because the sexually violent endanger the public
much more than the mentally ill.41 The State also argued that the
rational basis test is met by the greater procedural protection given to
those committed under chapter 980.42 To be committed under chapter
51, the State needs only five of six jurors to vote for commitment based
on clear and convincing evidence.43 Under chapter 980, the State needs
a unanimous jury to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt."
37. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 1.
38. Appellant's Brief at 13; Respondent's Brief at 37, State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279,541
N.W. 2d. 115 (1995) (No. 94-2356) (comparing Wis. STAT. § 51 (1987)).
39. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973).
40. Appeal Certification at 16.
41. Id. at 17.
42. Id.
43. Wis. STAT. § 51.20(11)(b) (1987).
44. WIS. STAT. § 980.03(3) (1994).
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WISCONSIN'S SEXUAL PREDATOR LAW
The criminal defendants, however, argued that because nothing is
more fundamental than freedom from commitment, the court must apply
the strict scrutiny test to chapter 980.4" Under strict scrutiny, the
defendants argued, the statute would thus fail because the standards for
release are too stringent.46 Unlike chapter 51, those committed under
chapter 980 do not have to be found treatable, and requiring someone
who is untreatable to be held until treatment has cured them is
"impossible by definition."'47 The defendants also argued that while
those committed under chapter 51 never carry the burden of proof to
obtain release, those committed under chapter 980, under some
circumstances, do.48
2. Double Jeopardy
Both the United States and the Wisconsin Constitutions protect
citizens from being tried twice for the same crime.49 However, this
protection does not extend to civil statutes.50
The parties in the Wisconsin appeal disagreed as to whether chapter
980 is criminal or civil. The State set forth seven reasons for believing
that chapter 980 is a civil statute.5 ' First, commitment is not to the
Department of Corrections, but rather to the Department of Health and
Human Services. Second, treatment, not punishment, is the goal of the
commitment. Third, the person committed may request release at any
time. Fourth, the statute specifically uses the term "civil commitments,"
which indicates the legislature's intent to create a civil statute. Fifth, the
fact that the statute incapacitates sex offenders is only incidental. Sixth,
the statute's criminal safeguards do not make it a criminal law. Seventh,
the statute cannot be inferred to have a punitive intent simply because
of the nature of its penalty.
The criminal defendants had a different view. They contended that
custody with Health and Human Services rather than Corrections is not
persuasive, that the goal of treatment is "a sham," and that the civil label
is not dispositive because the punitive intent makes the statute crimi-
45. Appeal Certification at 16.
46. Id at 19.
47. Id.
48. Once committed, if seeking release without approval, the defendant bears the burden
to show probable cause for a release hearing. Wis. STAT. § 980.09(2) (1994).
49. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Wis. CONsT. art. 1, § 8(1).
50. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 398-99 (1938).
51. Appeal Certification at 20-22.
1996]
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nal 2 They also cited the legislative history to show that incapacitation
based on future dangerousness, and not treatment, is the primary goal
of the statute, and that the criminal procedural protections, such as trial
by jury and the beyond a reasonable doubt requirement, prove the
statute is criminal.53
3. Ex Post Facto
An ex post facto law is one that is passed after the commission of an
act which retrospectively changes the legal consequences of that act.
54
Ex post facto laws are prohibited by both the United States and
Wisconsin Constitutions." That prohibition, however, applies only to
criminal laws. 56 Therefore, resolution of this issue is dependant upon
the determination of whether chapter 980 is criminal or civil.
4. Substantive Due Process
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process.5 7  Therefore, if involuntary commitment is a deprivation of
liberty, the State must have a compelling reason for the deprivation and
the legislation must be narrowly drawn to fit that reason. 8
In the appeal, the State conceded that, for purposes of substantive
due process, chapter 980 does implicate a fundamental right.5 9 Howev-
er, the State also argued that its compelling interest in community safety
outweighs a sexual predator's right to liberty.6°  To support this
position, the State compared civil commitment under chapter 980 to
commitment under the Bail Reform Act.61 In United States v. Saler-
no, 2 the United States Supreme Court held that a state can hold
dangerous defendants prior to trial in order to protect the community.63
The State interpreted this holding as establishing that public safety is a
52. Id at 22-23.
53. Id
54. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 580 (6th ed. 1990).
55. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 12.
56. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41 (1990).
57. U.S. CONST. amend. V and XIV, § 1; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 8.
58. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
59. Appeal Certification at 28.
60. Id at 29.
61. Id. The Bail Reform Act permits the denial of bail to criminal defendants who pose
a serious threat to the community if released on bail. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S.
739 (1987).
62. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
63. Id.
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justification for deprivation of liberty and thus a justification for
commitment under chapter 980.'
Alternatively, the criminal defendants argued that although the State
may have a compelling interest in protecting the community, chapter 980
is not drawn narrowly enough to achieve that interest and is, therefore,
unconstitutional.65 The main problem the defendants cited is the
definition of "mental disorder."66 Chapter 980 defines mental disorder
as "a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or
volitional capacity that predisposes a person to engage in acts of sexual
violence."'67 The defendants argued that because the power to form
intent sufficient for criminal liability assumes the capacity to make
choices, someone possessing the mens rea necessary to be convicted of
a sexual crime could not fall under the definition of "mental disor-
der."168
The defendants also argued that the term "mental disorder" is
unconstitutionally broad based on the requirements of Foucha v.
Louisiana.69 The Supreme Court in Foucha held that proof of both
"mental illness" and dangerousness is required for continued civil
commitment.' The defendants suggested that Foucha required a
narrow reading of mental illness which would not include all of those
who fall under the definition of mental disorder.7
Most of the issues presented by the parties in the Wisconsin appeal
were addressed by the Washington State Supreme Court in the case of
In re Young.72 The following section provides an analysis of the case.
64. Appeal Certification at 29. The defendants counter the State's argument by
reasoning that Salerno only passed constitutional muster because the length of confinement
under the Bail Reform Act is naturally limited by the right to a speedy trial. d at 31.
65. Id at 30.
66. k
67. WiS. STAT. § 980.01(2) (1994).
68. .Appeal Certification at 32.
69. 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
70. Id at 80.
71. Appeal Certification at 31.
72. 857 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1993). In re Young involved an appeal based on the
constitutionality of Washington's sexual predator law. The court's holding is significant as
Wisconsin's statute is based almost entirely upon the Washington statute. The Washington
State Supreme Court held that: (1) the commitment described in the statute was civil and thus
not violative of ex post facto or double jeopardy, (2) a provision must be included in the law
to permit the detainee to appear in court within 72 hours to contest probable cause, (3) the
statute is not void for vagueness, (4) the state must prove dangerousness of unincarcerated
detainees through evidence of recent overt acts, and (5) the statute must require jury
unanimity. Id. at 1018.
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IV. IN RE YOUNG AND ITS AFTERMATH
In re Young is based on the appeal of the commitments of two men,
Andre Brigham Young and Vance Russell Cunningham. 3  Andre
Young was convicted of six felony rapes.' Prior to release for the most
recent rape, a sexual predator petition was filed against Young.7 5  A
trial court, in an ex parte ruling, found probable cause for the petition
and ordered Young to submit to psychological testing.76 At trial, both
sides called multiple experts and Young's victims were allowed to testify
against him.77 In a unanimous verdict, the jury found Young to be a
sexually violent predator.78
Vance Russel Cunningham was convicted three times for rape.79
After completing his last prison sentence, a jury found Cunningham to
be a sexual predator."0
In the majority opinion, the Washington Supreme Court first
addressed the issues involving the ex post facto and double jeopardy
guarantees by resolving the threshold question of whether the Washing-
ton statute is criminal or civil.8' The court looked at the statute's
construction and concluded that, based upon the language of the statute
and its legislative history, the legislature had "a clear intent to create a
civil scheme."'  The court found it persuasive that the legislature used
the term "civil commitment" in the statute and that persons committed
under the statute were to be placed in the custody of social services.'
The court also looked at the impact of the statute because a "civil label
is not always dispositive... [when] 'the statutory scheme [is] so punitive'
73. Id. at 992.
74. Young's first series of rapes occurred in 1962. He broke into the respective homes
of four victims, threatened to kill two of them with a knife, and raped a third with her five-
week old infant nearby. Young was released in 1972 and five years later he was convicted of
raping a fifth victim. He was released for that rape in 1980 and raped his sixth victim in 1985.
Id. at 994.
75. I.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 994-95.
78. Id. at 995.
79. Id. In 1984, Cunningham raped a woman hitchhiker and threatened to kill her. He
pled guilty and was sentenced to 31 months in prison. Three months after his release,
Cunningham committed another brutal rape, and two months later he committed his third. Id.
80. Id. at 996.
81. Id.
82. I.
83. Id. at 997.
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.., it must be considered criminal .... ."" The court also compared
the Washington statute to an Illinois statute that provides for the
commitment of sexually violent persons in lieu of a prison sentence."
The Illinois statute was labeled a civil statute by the United States
Supreme Court in Allen v. Illinois.6 Both the Washington and the
Illinois statutes require that a person possess a mental disorder which
causes him or her to commit violent sex offenses. They also require that
the sex offender receive care and treatment from a psychiatric facility.'
Because the Washington Supreme Court found the statute to be civil, ex
post facto and double jeopardy guarantees were held not to apply.
The next issue the majority addressed was substantive due process.
The court recognized that since an individual's liberty is protected by the
United States Constitution, a state law that impinges upon a fundamental
liberty must further a compelling state interest, and be narrowly drawn
to serve that interest.8 8 Applying this strict scrutiny test, the court
found that the state has a "compelling interest both in treating sex
predators and protecting society from their actions." 9 The court also
found the statute to be narrowly drawn by suggesting that psychologists
are just as able to identify sexual psychopaths as they are able to identify
people with other mental abnormalities." Both defendants in this case
were identified as having "paraphilia," a sexual disorder with specific
characteristics.9" The court also addressed the issue of treating sexual
predators and concluded that "the mere fact that an illness is difficult to
treat does not mean that it is not an illness., 92
Finally, the majority also addressed equal protection within a
procedural due process analysis. The court found that the statute
satisfies equal protection because "there are good reasons to [procedural-
ly] treat mentally ill people differently than violent sex offenders."'93
Sexually violent predators are not similarly situated with the mentally ill
84. Id. (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980)).
85. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 105-1.01 (Smith-Hurd 1980).
86. 478 U.S. 364, 375 (1986).
87. In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 997 (Wash. 1993).
88. Id at 1000.
89. Id. (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979)).
90. See id. at 1002.
91. The characteristics of a paraphilia are sexual arousal and urges involving non-human
objects, suffering and humiliation of oneself and others, and the sexual attraction to children.
l
92. Id. at 1003. The court used schizophrenia as an example of another disorder that is
difficult to treat. Id.
93. lt at 1010.
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in regard to treatment method and "no constitutional right is violated
when persons who suffer from severe mental disorders are treated
differently from persons with less serious disorders ... ."' The court
also reasoned that the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard used for
sexual predators prevents them from being treated more harshly than the
mentally ill, who can be committed by the lower standard of "clear and
convincing evidence."'95
In re Young was an important opinion for proponents of sexual
predator laws. It was especially important for the proponents of
Wisconsin's law because it supported all of the constitutional arguments
raised by the State in the Wisconsin appeal. That support, however, was
dealt a substantial blow on August 25, 1995, when U.S. District Court
Judge John C. Coughenour overruled In re Young and declared
Washington's sexual predator law unconstitutional.96
In Young v. Weston, Judge Coughenour first focused on substantive
due process and concluded that freedom from bodily restraint is "[a]t the
heart of the liberty interests protected from arbitrary government
actions." 97 For this reason, Judge Coughenour theorized, the United
States Supreme Court has "carefully circumscribed the instances in which
a state may, for non-punitive reasons, detain or incarcerate an individu-
al." 98 Two such instances are: the detention of dangerous individuals
pending trial, and traditional civil commitment schemes for dangerous
individuals who are also mentally ill.99
Judge Coughenour then held that Washington's sexual predator
statute does not fit into the pretrial detention category because pretrial
detention is only for "stringently limited periods" while commitment
pursuant to the predator law is indefinite."°  He also held that the
sexual predator law is unlike traditional civil commitment schemes
because "[t]he essential component [is] missing from the Sexually Violent
Predator Statute . .. the requirement that the detainee be mentally
ill."1 ' Like the scheme rejected in Foucha v. Louisiana, the sexual
94. Id. at 1014 (explaining Bailey v. Gardebring, 940 F.2d 1150, 1153 (8th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 503 U.S. 952 (1992)).
95. id. at 1014-15.
96. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
97. Id. at 748. (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982)).
98. Id. at 748-49.
99. Id.
100. lit at 749.
101. Id. (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 82 (1992)).
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predator statute "permits indefinite incarceration based on little more
than a showing of potential future dangerousness."'"
Judge Coughenour next addressed the ex post facto clause and
concluded that because the predator statute applies to behavior that is
criminal, and applies only to persons who have been convicted of a
crime, the statute is criminal. 3 He also noted that the State can only
initiate proceedings after the sentence of the convicted offender is about
to expire or has expired."° Therefore, despite the State's claim that it
intended to provide treatment, the statute "evinces a keen interest in
punishment" because it forecloses the possibility that offenders will be
evaluated and treated before punishment.0 5
Finally, Judge Coughenour analyzed the double jeopardy clause using
the same criminal-civil analysis he applied to the ex post facto issue. In
doing so, Judge Coughenour concluded that double jeopardy is violated
because the sanction "serves the traditional aims of punish-
ment-retribution and deterrence."'16
The release of Judge Coughenour's decision created serious questions
about the fate of Wisconsin's sexual predator law. However, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court answered those questions on December 8,
1995, when it held, seven to one, that chapter 980 does not violate the
United States or Wisconsin Constitutions. An analysis of that decisions
follows.
V. THE WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT
In State v. Carpenter,"° and its companion case State v. Post,"°8
the Wisconsin Supreme Court addressed all of the constitutional issues
presented by the parties to the appeal. Although the opinions were
issued separately, this Comment will analyze them as one opinion.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 752.
104. Id.
105. lit at 752-53.
106. l at 753-54 (citation omitted).
107. 197 Wis. 2d 252, 541 N.W.2d 105 (1995).
108. 197 Wis. 2d 279, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995).
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A. The Majority
1. Double Jeopardy & Ex Post Facto
The court first addressed the double jeopardy and ex post facto issues
in State v. Carpenter."° The court found that chapter 980 does not
violate double jeopardy or ex post facto guarantees because the sanction
involved does not constitute punishment.
The court rejected the criminal defendants' argument that the
treatment component of chapter 980 is merely a pretense for punish-
ment.110 The court instead held that "the emphasis on treatment in
chapter 980 is evident from its plain language." '' As examples, the
court cited specific sections of chapter 980, which it concluded prove that
the statute is "aimed primarily at treating the sexually violent person, not
punishing the individual.' 1 2
2. Substantive Due Process
The court addressed substantive due process in the companion case
State v. Post."' First, the court pronounced that freedom from physical
restraint is a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause, which
requires a strict scrutiny analysis."' The court then elucidated that
chapter 980 satisfies strict scrutiny because the State has a compelling
interest in both protecting the community from the "dangerously
mentally disordered" and in providing care and treatment to those with
mental disorders."5 These "dual interests" have been recognized by
the United States Supreme Court as legitimate, the first under a state's
police powers, and the latter under a state's parens patriae powers. 16
Next, the majority held that the term "mental disorder" as defined
by chapter 980 satisfies substantive due process.1 17 The court explained
that "mental illness" is not required by the federal or state constitutions.
109. 197 Wis. 2d 252, 541 N.W.2d 105 (1995).
110. Id. at 226, 541 N.W.2d at 110.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 267, 541 N.W.2d at 111. The court cited §§ 980.015(3)(b), 980.06(1),
980.06(2)(b), and 980.06(2)(c).
113. 197 Wis. 2d 279, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995).
114. l at 302, 541 N.W.2d at 122.
115. IL
116. lId (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,426 (1979)). "Parens patriae originates
from the English common law where the King had a royal prerogative to act as guardian to
persons with legal disabilities .... " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 769 (6th ed. 1990).
117. Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 303, 541 N.W.2d at 122.
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Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has "declined to
enunciate a single definition that must be used as the mental condition
sufficient for involuntary [civil] commitment." '118 Therefore, it is up to
the states to formulate their own procedural mechanisms for civil
commitment, particularly in areas "'fraught with medical and scientific
uncertainties."119
Finally, the court discussed problems with predicting future
dangerousness."2  In doing so, the court held that "although predic-
tions of future dangerousness may be difficult, they are still an attain-
able, in fact essential, part of our judicial process.' 2'
3. Equal Protection
The court began its equal protection analysis by accepting the
proposition that persons committed under chapter 51 and chapter 980
are "similarly situated for purposes of an equal protection compari-
son."'" Next, the court outlined the three levels of scrutiny that can
be applied to equal protection cases: strict, intermediate, and rational
basis." However, the court did not decide which level of scrutiny
should be applied to chapter 980. The Court instead concluded that it
was unnecessary to select the appropriate level of scrutiny because
chapter 980 passes even the highest level of scrutiny.24 In concluding
chapter 980 passes the highest level of scrutiny, the court deferred to the
state legislature's determination that classes of persons predisposed to
sexual violence pose a higher level of danger to the community than do
other classes of mentally ill persons."z The court agreed that this
higher level of dangerousness, along with the unique treatment needs of
sexually violent persons, "justif[ies] distinct legislative approaches to
further the compelling government purpose of protection of the
public."'126
118. Id. at 304, 541 N.W.2d at 123.
119. 1& (quoting Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 370 (1983)).
120. Id at 306, 541 N.W.2d at 124.
121. Id at 312, 541 N.W.2d at 126 (citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 897 (1983)).
122. Id at 319, 541 N.W.2d at 129.
123. Id. at 319-20, 541 N.W.2d at 129.
124. Pd at 320, 541 N.W.2d at 130.
125. Id at 321, 541 N.W.2d at 130.
126. Id at 322-23, 541 N.W.2d at 130.
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The court then addressed the specific differences between chapter 980
and chapter 51.127 In doing so, it concluded that all but one of those
differences is justified under a strict scrutiny analysis. The one difference
the court determined to be in violation of equal protection is that
chapter 980 does not provide for jury trials at discharge hearings, while
chapter 51 does."z The court found that there was no justification for
this distinction and "equal protection demands that a right to a jury trial
be made available at this important stage. ' 129  The court, therefore,
held that chapter 980 must now be construed to afford the right to
request a jury at discharge hearings under section 980.09 and sec-
tion 980.10.13°
B. The Dissent
While Justice Shirley Abrahamson was the only Justice to dissent, she
claimed to have found "overwhelming evidence" in chapter 980's
legislative history, purpose, and effect to prove that the scheme has a
"principally punitive purpose." ' First she explained that references
to treatment do not make a statute civil.132 As an example, she cited
chapter 302, which, she said, is arguably the most punitive of Wisconsin's
statutes and nevertheless refers to treatment thirty times. 33 Second,
Justice Abrahamson pointed out that chapter 980 does not even refer to
its own commitment scheme as "civil commitment."'' " In fact the
word "civil" appears only once in chapter 980, in the section referring to
"immunity from civil liability." '135 Third, Justice Abrahamson relayed
statements from Wisconsin Governor Tommy Thompson and chapter 980
sponsor Legislator Lolita Schneiders, which she said made clear that
chapter 980's primary purpose is punishment.'36  Fourth, Justice
127. Id. at 323, 541 N.W.2d at 130. For example, chapter 51 requires that committees
be "'proper subject[s] for treatment,"' while chapter 980 does not have such a requirement.
Id. at 323, 541 N.W.2d at 130. The court found that "[b]ecause sexually violent persons pose
specialized treatment problems . . . the legislature is justified in not requiring a showing of
amenability to treatment." Id. at 324, 541 N.W.2d at 131.
128. Id. at 328, 541 N.W.2d at 132.
129. Id. at 328-29, 541 N.W.2d at 132-33.
130. Id. at 329, 541 N.W.2d at 133.
131. Id. at 338, 541 N.W.2d at 136 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 339, 541 N.W.2d at 137.
133. 1l See WIS. STAT. § 302 (1993-94) (governing state prisons and jails).
134. Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 340, 541 N.W.2d at 137.
135. Id. at 340 n.9, 541 N.W.2d at 138 n.9. See also WIS. STAT. § 980.015(4).
136. Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 343, 541 N.W.2d at 139. (Governor Thompson said, "'[w]e
might be able to use this civil commitment procedure to keep them [i.e., convicted sex
offenders] in jail."' (Alternation in original). Id (Legislator Schneiders said that the bill
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Abrahamson pointed out that chapter 980 is "placed squarely within the
criminal portion of the Wisconsin statutes," and the position of a statute
is "very persuasive as to its intent."'37  Finally, Justice Abrahamson
asked the thought provoking question, "[w]hy would a legislature with
a principal interest in treatment create a statute deliberately delaying the
promised treatment and thereby exacerbating the alleged ills which it is
designed to cure?' 138
Substantive due process was the next issue addressed by Justice
Abrahamson. She concluded that "[b]ecause chapter 980 allows the
commitment of individuals who are not both mentally ill and dangerous
... it violates substantive due process guarantees of the Wisconsin and
federal constitutions.', 139 Justice Abrahamson argued that the "mental
condition component" of a civil commitment statute cannot be defined
however the state pleases. If it could, it would have no core meaning
and could mean everything, and if it means everything, it means
nothing.Y Furthermore, mental disorder is a broad category of
disorders that all of us could fall under.'' Therefore, the only compo-
nent of chapter 980's definition which separates sexual predators from
everyone else is the predisposition to engage in acts of sexual violence,
and a violent predisposition is not sufficient to justify commitment.Y4 2
Equal protection was the last constitutional issue Justice Abrahamson
reviewed. She contended that "the distinctions separating chapter 980
from chapter 51 have no rational basis . ,,.4" Sex offenders being
freed at the end of their prison terms "'should be entitled to the same
protections granted other citizens.""'
"seeks to place further restrictions on the most heinous of repeat sexual offenders by insuring
that the prison stay [would] be lengthened.") Id. at 344, 541 N.W.2d at 139.
137. Ied at 346, 541 N.W.2d at 140.
138. Id at 346-47, 541 N.W.2d at 140.
139. Id at 351, 541 N.W.2d at 142.
140. Id at 352, 541 N.W.2d at 142.
141. 1d at 354, 541 N.W.2d at 143 (mental disorders include common problems such as
insomnia and caffeine-induced anxiety). Id at 354-55, 541 N.W.2d at 143.
142. Id. at 356, 541 N.W.2d at 144. Justice Abrahamson calls chapter 980's definition
of mental disorder "entirely circular" because she says "a prospective committee's 'mental
disorder' is derived from past sexual offenses which, in turn, are used to establish a
predisposition to commit future sexual offenses." Id. at 355, 541 N.W.2d at 143-44.
143. Id. at 359, 541 N.W.2d at 145.
144. Id. at 361, 541 N.W.2d at 146 (citation omitted).
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VI. FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS
The debate over the constitutionality of sexual predator laws is far
from over. Assistant State Public Defender Ken Casey, who represented
two of the four criminal defendants in the Wisconsin appeal said, "[w]e
are going to ask the United States Supreme Court to review the
decision."'45 Likewise, Washington plans to appeal the District Court
decision that overruled their Supreme Court.' 46
There are still a number of unresolved questions in the sexual
predator debate that future courts will be asked to answer. For example:
what level of equal protection scrutiny should apply to sexual predator
statutes? The Wisconsin Supreme Court disposed of the equal protec-
tion issue simply by holding that chapter 980 satisfied strict scrutiny.
However, sexual predator statutes may not need to satisfy strict scrutiny
to pass an equal protection challenge.
The United States Supreme Court has clearly indicated its reluctance
to afford strict scrutiny to any additional equal protection classifica-
tions. 47 Moreover, the High Court has explicitly refused to apply strict
scrutiny to classifications involving the mentally retarded and the
mentally ill.141 Therefore, it is unlikely sexual predators laws will need
to pass anything other than minimum rationality to satisfy equal
protection.
Even if sexual predator laws are subject to only minimum rationality
for equal protection purposes, it is likely they will still be subject to strict
scrutiny for substantive due process purposes. Therefore, substantive
due process is the most vulnerable of the constitutional issues implicated
by sexual predator laws.
Both the Washington and Wisconsin Supreme Courts concluded that
sexual predators have a diagnosable condition and, therefore, the statutes
are narrow enough to further the state's interest in treatment. This
conclusion, however, is contrary to the opinion of many people in the
psychiatry field. Psychiatrists argue that many of the symptoms
displayed by sex offenders are not unique to them, and a failure to
145. Mike Miller, New Facility Needed for Sex Predators? CAPITOL TIMES, Dec. 9, 1995,
at A3.
146. Doug Conner, State Weighs Options for Sex Offenders, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE, Sept. 16, 1995, at A5.
147. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (holding that mental
retardation is not a suspect classification).
148. Heller v. Doe by Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993) (holding that a rational basis standard
applies to classifications treating the mentally retarded differently from the mentally ill).
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consider environmental factors like unemployment and drug abuse
during diagnosis creates the likelihood of a false positive diagnosis.
149
To reduce the likelihood of a false diagnosis, statutory guidelines should
be set to ensure that the evaluations are sufficiently extensive. In
addition, specialized training and experience should be required of the
evaluators. Considering the magnitude of harm that could result from
a false diagnosis, basic medical ethics should demand that the evaluation
process be stringently regulated.'5
Once a sexual predator is committed, treatment problems can arise
that may affect substantive due process. For example funding limitations
can prevent adequate, individualized treatment, which in turn can effect
the length of confinement. Wisconsin Department of Corrections
Secretary Michael Sullivan estimated that it costs $60,000 per year per
patient to treat sexual predators; and there are currently 2,700 prisoners
in the system who will eventually be screened under the law.'
However, the maximum prison sentences for the most serious sexual
assaults have been increased to 40 years, which means many of the newly
incarcerated sex offenders will not live to see a mandatory release date
let alone a chapter 980 petition.5 2
Another controversial aspect of sexual predator statutes is the
problem of predicting future dangerousness. 5 3 Some commentators
argue that it is impossible to predict future dangerousness' 51 However,
general predictions of dangerousness have been upheld by the U.S.
Supreme Court. For example, in Jurek v. Texas, 5 the Court said a
jury can be asked to impose the death penalty if it finds a probability
that the defendant would commit future violent acts.1 56
Finally, a future court will have to determine the exact applicability
of the holding in Foucha v. Louisiana57 Foucha recognized that an
individual can be involuntarily confined through civil commitment
149. Robert M. Wettstein, M.D., A Psychiatric Perspective on Washington's Sexually
Violent Predators Statute, 15 U. PUGET SOuND L. REv. 597, 606-07 (1992).
150. There is no nationally practiced credentialing or licensing policy for individuals who
claim expertise in evaluating and treating sex offenders. Id at 611.
151. Miller, supra note 145.
152. Id.
153. Chapter 980 requires the State to prove that a substantial probability exists that the
offender will engage in future acts of sexual violence. Wis. STAT. § 980.01(7) (1994).
154. See Greg Rosenberg, Chapter 980-The Sexual Predator Act: Responding to State
Expert Testimony, Wis. DEFENDER, July 1994, at 1, 12.
155. 428 U.S. 262 (1976), hold'g ltd., 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
156. Id. at 274-75.
157. 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
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proceedings if the State can show by clear and convincing evidence that
the individual is mentally ill and dangerous. '58 Chapter 980 does not
require a mental illness as defined by Foucha. The probable reason for
not requiring mental illness is to allow for a person to be criminally
culpable for the crime as well as to allow for civil commitment later.'59
Although chapter 980 does not require a mental illness, it does
require a narrowly defined mental disorder, which may be enough to
satisfy Foucha. In Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Foucha she
stressed that the Court's holding "addresses only [the unconstitutionality
of] the specific statutory scheme before us, which broadly permits
indefinite confinement of sane insanity acquittees in psychiatric facilities.
This case does not require us to pass judgement on more narrowly drawn
laws .. .
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite the substantive due process concerns, Wisconsin's sexual
predator law is a very effective method for reducing sexually violent
crimes. Some opponents argue that the criminal justice system is the
only way to deal with serious offenders.161 That reasoning, however,
ignores the reality of the criminal justice system. Prison is a breeding
ground for violence and mental illness.' 62 Many offenders are released
early or refuse or are denied treatment.'" The treatment provisions
of chapter 980 can give some sex offenders a second chance. Medical
therapy, such as use of the drug Depo-Provera, has been successful at
decreasing sex offenders' physical urges.I" Behavioral and cognitive
therapy can help the offender learn to express emotion and deal with
relationships. 65 Ideally, if an offender can be cured through treatment,
he may spend less time in civil commitment than he would in jail had he
offended again.
158. Id. at 80.
159. A fine line can exist between criminal culpability and mental disability. One author
calls this the "Twilight Zone." NATHANIEL J. PALLONE, REHABILITATING CRIMINAL SEXUAL
PSYCHOPAThS 2 (1990).
160. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 86-87 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
161. But see McCaffrey, supra note 2, at 912.
162. Bochnewich, supra note 6, at 303.
163. Virginia Governor George Allen recently announced his intention to end funding
for prison sex offender treatment programs, citing as his reason his belief that treatment does
not work. Jerome G. Miller, The Folly of Not Treating Sex Offenders, THE WASHINGTON
POST, Jan. 10, 1995, at A17.
164. RONALD M. HOLMES, SEX CRIMES 113 (1991).
165. Id. at 112.
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With crime increasing at an alarming rate, state legislatures are
forced to take drastic measures to ensure the safety of law-abiding
citizens. The Wisconsin legislature has the authority under its parens
patriae power to provide care for its mentally disordered citizens.
Furthermore, it has the authority under its police power to protect the
community from dangerous sex offenders. Chapter 980 is a constitution-
al use of both of these powers and should be upheld by future courts.
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